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Abstract
Whilst computer-mediated communication (CMC) can benefit users by
providing quick and easy communication between those separated by time
and space, it can also provide varying degrees of anonymity that may en-
courage a sense of impunity and freedom from being held accountable for
inappropriate online behaviour. As such, CMC is a fertile ground for study-
ing impoliteness, whether it occurs in response to perceived threat (flam-
ing), or as an end in its own right (trolling). Currently, first and second-
order definitions of terms such as im/politeness (Brown and Levinson 1987;
Bousfield 2008; Culpeper 2008; Terkourafi 2008), in-civility (Lakoff
2005), rudeness (Beebe 1995, Kienpointner 1997, 2008), and etiquette
(Coulmas 1992), are subject to much discussion and debate, yet the CMC
phenomenon of trolling is not adequately captured by any of these terms.
Following Bousfield (in press), Culpeper (2010) and others, this paper
suggests that a definition of trolling should be informed first and foremost
by user discussions. Taking examples from a 172-million-word, asynchro-
nous CMC corpus, four interrelated conditions of aggression, deception,
disruption, and success are discussed. Finally, a working definition of troll-
ing is presented.
Keywords: Computer-mediated communication, conflict, impoliteness, troll,
trolling
1. Introduction
Research into computer-mediated communication (CMC), the com-
munication that occurs between humans via some form of computer,
such as a desktop, mobile phone or similar (December 1997: 5; Ferris
1997; Herring 2003: 612) now spans over fifty years and covers areas as
diverse as human-computer interaction (HCI), child-computer interac-
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tion (ChiCI) and computer-supported cooperative work (CSCW). How-
ever, whilst research has been conducted on the effects of, for instance,
aggressive video games and their link with offline violence (e. g., Scott
1995; van Schie and Wiegman 1997; Dill and Dill 1998), little research
currently investigates linguistic aggression online, possibly because CMC
is perceived as frivolous, insignificant or marginal (Herring and Nix
1997: 1; Merchant 2001: 295; Cho et al. 2005). This paper seeks to begin
to redress this balance.
Specifically, this paper argues that current terminology used in the
field(s) of im/politeness1 does not comfortably describe the phenomenon
of trolling2. Following Watts (2003: 9), this paper takes the view that
“investigating first-order politeness is the only valid means of developing
a social theory of politeness”, but diverging from Watts and adopting
approaches used by, among others, Culpeper (2010) and Bousfield (in
press), the aim of this paper is to build a working definition of “trolling”
from lay user discussions of this term. In short, the research question
might be phrased as, “What academic definition of ‘trolling’ can be ex-
tracted from user discussions?”
Section 2 reviews recent and relevant impoliteness terminology and
CMC research. Section 3 outlines the 172-million-word corpus of un-
moderated, asynchronous CMC (ACMC) used in this research, and the
methodology adopted. Section 4 analyzes user discussions of the terms
“troll”, “troller”, “trolling” and so forth, and preliminary results suggest
that trolling is manifestly made up of four interrelated characteristics:
aggression, deception, disruption, and success. These are addressed in
sections 4.1 to 4.4. In section 5, this paper begins to formulate a defini-
tion of trolling, and section 6 provides the conclusion.
2. Im/politeness and computer-mediated communication
This section covers several broad types and definitions of impoliteness,
before outlining CMC and extant research on trolling. By necessity,
these reviews are brief; far more could be, and indeed has been said on
both impoliteness and CMC, but given the limitations of this paper, only
the most relevant aspects will be covered.
2.1. Definitions
As Watts (2003: 9) argues, “(im)politeness is a term that is struggled over
at present, has been struggled over in the past and will, in all probability,
continue to be struggled over in the future” and inevitably, growing in-
terest in the field(s) of im/politeness has triggered a dramatic growth in
terminology, such as “impoliteness”, “rudeness”, “face-attack”, “conflict”
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and “incivility”. In early research, particularly on politeness, “research-
ers focused on the structural properties of arguments or disputes, but
gradually the focus shifted to more contextual strategies, and more re-
cently, scholars are investigating how the self or selves is or are consti-
tuted through conflict and how ideology is constructed and reflected
through conflict talk” (Kakava´ 2001: 650). In other words, the emphasis
has shifted from syntactic form with limited acknowledgement of
contextual factors, to pragmatic function which attempts to account
more fully for context and considers, but does not give undue promi-
nence to, syntactic form. As such, researchers are latterly grappling with
a potentially indefinite range of communicative behaviours (unintended
lack of politeness, off-record insult), influenced by any number of
contextual variables (power, distance, affect), rather than focussing pur-
ely on linguistic forms and structures (taboo words, commands, tag-
questions) which, as per some earlier research in the field, were thought
to be amenable to categorization as “more polite” or “less polite” (cf.
Leech 1983).
One consequence of the evolving perspectives of im/politeness has
been the growth and change of associated metalanguage, and the follow-
ing subsections group together some of the major, academic impoliteness
terms and their definitions found across a range of research. By neces-
sity, this paper cannot account for every term, nor does it seek to enter
the debate about which is more or less valid. Terminology certainly is
“just one of many issues that face those interested in conducting research
into and concerning ‘impoliteness’, ‘rudeness’, ‘aggressive language’, ‘the
causing of offence’ or linguistic behaviour which may be otherwise rec-
ognized (if not termed) as socially-negative face-work will have to con-
sider” (Bousfield in press). This work will instead argue more simply
that none of the current terms is suitable for capturing the phenomenon
of trolling. In section 5, these terms, their definitions, and their inability
to comfortably describe and define trolling are returned to and discussed
further. This paper finally argues that, though this will add yet another
term to a field already burgeoning with many, it is needful to recognize
“troll” and formulate for it a definition, in order to adequately under-
stand and discuss this behaviour academically.
2.1.1. Ritual or mock impoliteness. Ritual, or mock impoliteness “is an
offensive way of being friendly” (Leech 1983: 144), which, in Anglo-
American culture, can take the form of “sounding” or “playing the doz-
ens”, or in other words, using highly ritualized insults, usually rhyming
and meant to be clearly untrue. In other words, whilst the form may
contain features which a lay-person might consider to be inherently im-
polite, the function is actually to enhance and reinforce closeness, affect,
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group cohesion, and so forth between speaker/producer/writer (hereon
S or, purely for alliterative convenience, she) and hearer/recipient/reader
(hereon H or, again for alliterative convenience, he) (Haugh 2008). This
is distinct from other forms of impoliteness which, under ordinary cir-
cumstances, are likely to encourage distance, disaffect, and division be-
tween S and H (Labov 1972).
2.1.2. Non-malicious impoliteness. Non-malicious impoliteness is an utter-
ance performed without malice, but which S anticipates may cause of-
fence anyway, such as when a tutor criticizes a students’ work. Non-
malicious impoliteness is a by-product of S undertaking the task at hand,
requirements of her role, or similar (Goffman 1967: 14; Culpeper et al.
2003: 1549; Culpeper 2005: 3637). Due to the lack of malicious
S-intent, it is arguable that this type of behaviour might not be classed
as impoliteness at all. As above, however, it is not the point of this work
to argue for the validity of the terms, but rather to show that they do
not account for trolling.
2.1.3. Rudeness, faux pas, failed politeness. Culpeper (2005: 63) cites
rudeness as the unintentional absence of appropriately polite behaviour,
and Goffman (1967: 14) suggests that S “may appear to have acted inno-
cently; [her] offence seems to be unintended and unwitting … In our
society one calls such threats to face faux pas, gaffes, boners or bricks”.
Similarly, failed politeness (Beebe 1995: 166) covers instances where S
intends to convey a polite attitude but misjudges the degree or type of
politeness required, and thus causes offence (Culpeper 2005: 37). Cul-
tural variation in the meanings of, for instance, interruption, silence, and
directness can lead to an interpretation of impoliteness where none was
intended. This type of impoliteness is H-interpretation-based, rather
than S-intention-based (cf. failed impoliteness), and Bousfield (2008: 73)
further distinguishes between failed politeness where H correctly recog-
nizes that S did not intend to be impolite (but is still offended anyway),
and instances where H incorrectly interprets malicious S-intent.
2.1.4. Failed (malicious) impoliteness. Failed (malicious) impoliteness is
S-intended impoliteness that is not correctly interpreted as such by H.
In other words, H either does not recognize impoliteness, or he misinter-
prets the utterance as, for instance, mock impoliteness, non-malicious
impoliteness, or failed politeness (Bousfield 2008: 73).
2.1.5. Thwarted/frustrated (malicious) impoliteness. Bousfield (2008: 72,
note 6) outlines a further type of impoliteness which, for the sake of
clarity, this paper terms thwarted/frustrated impoliteness (Bousfield, per-
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sonal communication). In this case, although S’s malicious intent is cor-
rectly reconstructed by H, the impoliteness is frustrated, or thwarted,
because H is simply not offended and either takes no action (i. e., frus-
trates the attempt), or counters with, for instance, sarcasm, contempt,
amusement, or suchlike (i. e., thwarts the attempt). Bousfield (2008: 72,
note 6) provides the example of a child trying, and failing, to insult a
parent, however, impoliteness may still be thwarted/frustrated even when
S is equal to, or more powerful than H.
2.1.6. Genuine, malicious, or strategic impoliteness, or instrumental rude-
ness. These terms by Culpeper et al. (2003: 1546), Goffman (1967: 14),
Lakoff (1989), Bandura (1973), and Beebe (1995: 159) respectively, refer
to the kind of act that S carries out not only with the intention of causing
H offence, but also of conveying that intent to H. Bousfield (in press)
offers a fuller definition of impoliteness as constituting:
[T]he issuing of intentionally gratuitous and conflictive face-threat-
ening acts (FTAs) that are purposefully performed:
1) Unmitigated, in contexts where mitigation (where mitigation
equates with politeness) is required and/or,
2) With deliberate aggression, that is, with the face threat ex-
acerbated, ‘boosted’, or maximized in some way to heighten the
face damage inflicted.
Furthermore, for impoliteness to be considered successful impolite-
ness, the intention of the speaker (or ‘author’) to ‘offend’ (threaten/
damage face) must be understood by those in a receiver role.
(Bousfield in press)
Within this definition of impoliteness, not only must S intend to be im-
polite, H must also correctly reconstruct her intent, though whether H
then conveys back to S that he has recognized her intent is another
matter entirely. To differentiate from thwarted/frustrated impoliteness,
which is essentially identical except that H does not take offence, this
paper refers to this as successful (malicious) impoliteness (Bousfield in
press).
2.1.7. S-intention and H-interpretation. Throughout all of the above defi-
nitions, intention and interpretation are recurring issues. H (and analyst)
must hypothesize from the evidence at hand, sometimes quite quickly,
just what S actually intended (Culpeper et al. 2003: 1552; Mills 2003:
136). In impoliteness research these issues have only been more recently
tackled. Previous frameworks tended to focus on S-intent (e. g., Brown
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and Levinson 1978, 1987; Lachenicht 1980) or on H-interpretation (e. g.,
Austin 1987, 1990), allowing the possibility that failed impoliteness on
the one hand, or failed politeness on the other, might be analyzed as
successful impoliteness. More recent research has begun to draw in both
S and H (e. g., Culpeper 2005; Bousfield 2008,) but there is further work
to be done, and this paper seeks to address this issue to some extent.
Mooney (2004: 900) suggests that rather than retrieving the actual
intention itself, based on the available evidence, H will reconstruct S’s
intention(s) with variable levels of certainty, and arrive at one or more
hypotheses of what they feel S may have intended:
Example (1) [070807]3
1. A Either 1) You are a jerk. 2) You are stupid. 3) You are a
troll. 4) All of the above. By your comments you are sug-
gesting that the girl have somehow prevented this tragedy
by the introduction of more electrolytes.
Example (2) [060915]
2. B She keeps challenging and asking questions like she is re-
ally interested in understanding our belief and logic then
acts like the victim. Beginning to wonder if she is a troll or
trying to get some type of ego trip, emotional gratification,
or neurotransmitter “high” from debating/arguing.
Example (3) [060318]
3. C I’m sorry, but I’m beginning to think you are a troll?
As per the examples above, A posits two possible interpretations (an
intent to troll, or to be a jerk  it seems unrealistic to suggest that one
intends to be stupid), B offers two and C documents a change in her
interpretation of another’s intent. In each case, however, users may be
interpreting an intent to troll where none is intended, and in other cir-
cumstances, users may fail to construct an intent to troll where it is
intended. In other words, to reduce interaction to “H interprets S’s intent
accurately” versus “H interprets S’s intent inaccurately” is misleading. In
ordinary interaction, we do not have the luxury of categorically knowing
anything about S’s real intent4. Instead, we are continually working from
assumption, deduction, and premise, though we may at times have such
confidence in our interpretations to feel that they are fully accurate.
The issue of intent/interpretation does not stop here. Both S and H,
consciously or otherwise, also assess their own and the other’s utter-
ances, and attempt to reconstruct the assessments of their own behaviour
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that the other has arrived at. For instance, H may assess S’s utterance
as follows: “Do I feel S’s utterance has the potential to cause offence?
Yes. Do I think they intended to be offensive? No. Am I offended? No.”
Meanwhile, S may reason thus: “I do not have impolite intentions. I do
not think my utterance has the potential to cause offence. Do I think H
will perceive that I intended to be impolite? No.” (cf. Bousfield in press,
Table 1). In this case, S may self-assess her behaviour as politic and judge
that H sees it likewise, whilst H may view S’s utterance as a faux pas.
Other Hs may judge differently:
Example (4) [060929]
4. A That poster “C” is a troll. Have you guys not figured that
out yet? Read his post on [URL] and elsewhere.
5. B A I don’t think C is a “troll”.
Example (5) [030925]
6. D BTW [by the way], E is neither a troll nor is she baiting you
any more than you are baiting her IMO [in my opinion].
Interestingly, this potential, or apparent, mismatch between S-intent and
H-interpretation is open to deliberate, complex exploitation by interac-
tants. From H’s perspective, as Culpeper et al. (2003: 15661567) dis-
cuss, H may interpret that S intends to be impolite, but, as a passive
counter strategy, he may behave as though he has not interpreted it in
an attempt to recast the impoliteness as failed. Alternatively, if he is
offended, he may adopt an active counter strategy and respond as if he
does recognize, but is unhurt by it, thereby attempting to reformulate
the (perceived) attack as frustrated, thwarted, or mock impoliteness. If
S cannot be sure that H correctly recovered her intent, then she may
have to settle for what appears to be failed impoliteness.
From S’s perspective, one way to attack and at the same time attempt
to evade possible consequences is to use off-record malicious impolite-
ness. The assessment of the degree of on- or off-recordness may be nego-
tiated and contested by the interactants over a number of turns (Aronson
and Rundström 1989), but as on-record as S may make her utterance,
this does not mean that her intent is, or ever becomes, retrievable.
Rather, increased on-recordness means that fewer, and ultimately only
one particular interpretation, can be reasonably attributed to her utter-
ance. One reason that S may choose to be more off-record such that
“there is more than one unambiguously attributable intention so that
the actor cannot be held to have committed [her]self to one particular
intent” (Brown and Levinson 1987: 69), is because incontrovertible, on-
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record attacks increase the risk that H may reciprocate with equal, or
greater impoliteness (Culpeper 1996: 355; Andersson and Pearson 1999;
Bousfield 2008: 220), potentially leading to a conflict spiral which could
get entirely out of hand (Felson 1982: 245, Locher 2004). Another reason
is that, by keeping her intent off-record, S makes it more difficult for H
to hold her to account, since H may be unable to reconstruct her intent
with enough confidence.
At the logical extreme, if S makes her attack off-record enough, H
may not disambiguate the correct, or any, intent at all (Grimshaw 1990:
281). In the data, this very issue introduces a distinct bias towards pre-
dominantly discussing trolling according to H-interpretation-based ex-
amples, since, for trolling to have a chance of succeeding, S must try to
keep her trolling intent off-record, or deny accusations as they arise:
Example (6) [060318]
7. A If you are a troll … I’m sure you’d never admit it. If there
even is a *real* pony in all of this, I feel very sorry for it.
8. B I am not a troll … I am only doing what my vet has advised
me to do.
Example (7) [060514]
9. C If I say something that makes you nervous on account of
your horsey experiences, that doesn’t make me a troll.
Example (8) [090603]
10. D I am not a troll, you little jealous children.
Of course, B, C, and D may not be trollers at all, but given the inability
of any individual to prove the “innocence” or “sincerity” of their inten-
tion(s), meeting the accusation with a denial is unlikely to resolve the
issue. If a user’s behaviour is clearly unacceptable, however, such as
when S explicitly acknowledges a trolling intent, or if her posts are too
unambiguously or repeatedly troll-like in nature, then it will increase the
users’ confidence in their interpretation, and taking action against the
intent, rather that the content of her posts becomes a relatively incontro-
vertible affair:
Example (9) [030929]
11. A Killfiles, girls. Use your killfiles and send this troll to the
muck pile.
In short, the net result of trollers attempting to keep their intent off-
record leads to few S-intent examples beyond straightforward denials,
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whilst H-interpretation examples dominate. The bias towards H-inter-
pretation is not insurmountable, but within the corpus, so far, there is
only one instance where S openly declares an intent to troll:
Example (10) [050427]
12. A I love trolling on the horse news groups. It is just plain
FUNNY. They have gotten used to my trolls. Any ideas on
a good troll for the horse people?
There is no guarantee even here, however, that we have S’s genuine intent
on-record. For instance, this S may have entered the group, been heavily
criticized for breaching norms, and then claimed to be trolling in order
to save face, but whatever the case, the number of S-intent examples
does not begin parallel the sheer volume of H-interpretation examples.
With an increased corpus size it is reasonable to predict that there will
be more examples, and whilst beyond the scope of this paper, it is being
investigated for future research.
2.2. Computer-mediated communication and trolling
CMC has been variously praised and criticized by countless academics,
lay users, and the media, for the profound impact it has had on almost
every sphere of our lives, but for every benefit there is usually an oppos-
ing drawback. This paper only focuses on points most relevant to the
analysis and discussion, but suffice it to say, this account is far from
exhaustive. To summarise, CMC can allow those separated by time and
space to communicate quickly and easily, but it cannot (fully) replicate
FtF cues, thereby increasing the chances of miscommunication, and in
turn, conflict (Zdenek 1999: 390; Herring 2003: 612). CMC allows people
to create and maintain social and professional contacts in a way that
would otherwise be nearly impossible, but it can also allow users to
research the details of others, or even to contact them, for the purposes
of crime, bullying, and so on. Further, CMC gives us access to unprece-
dented amounts of information on almost any topic, but that informa-
tion can be dangerously wrong, and CMC can encourage us to feel a
stronger sense of commonality with others than we might experience
FtF, potentially leading users to believe that they have more in common
than they actually do (Thurlow et al. 2004: 54).
In short, the possibility of deception, whether intentional or acciden-
tal, or self- or other-imposed, is greatly increased in CMC (Spears and
Lea 1992; Rheingold 1993; Preece 2000). This is because CMC can offer
a very high degree of anonymity, and a great deal more control over a
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self-presentation than is available FtF, but this anonymity can also foster
a sense of impunity, loss of self-awareness, and a likelihood of acting
upon normally inhibited impulses, an effect known as deindividuation
(Kiesler et al. 1984, Siegel et al. 1986). This, it is said, is manifested in
behaviour such as flaming (Douglas and McGarty 2001: 399), and, this
paper argues, in the closely related behaviour of trolling.
Whilst there has been academic interest in negatively marked online
behaviours such as spamming (e. g., Stivale 1997; Barron 2006), cybers-
talking (e. g., Bocij 2004) and cyberbullying (e. g., Strom and Strom
2005, Topc¸u et al. 2008), issues such as trolling and flaming have in
general been left to popular literature (e. g., Shea 1994: Ch. 7) and the
media (e. g., Black 2006; Cox 2006; Brandel 2007; Naraine 2007; Moulit-
sas 2008). There is surprisingly little academic research that bridges the
gap between impoliteness on the one hand, and CMC on the other (see,
however, Herring et al. 2002; Graham 2007, 2008; Shin 2008). Extant
academic research employs the terms “troll”, “trolling”, and so forth in
a variety of ways, drawing these definitions variously from the media,
online ephemera such as The Troller’s FAQ (1996), and personal intu-
ition. As such, “trolling” has become a catch-all term for any number of
negatively marked online behaviours.
For instance, Herring et al. (2002: 372) and Turner et al. (2005) de-
scribe trolling as the luring of others into useless, circular discussion,
without necessarily involving argument, whilst Donath (1999: 45) and
Utz (2005: 50) suggest that a troller may intentionally disseminate poor
advice, thereby provoking others to correct them. Tepper (1997: 41) ex-
plains how trolling can delineate in-group/out-group membership: those
who “bite” signal novice, out-group status, whilst in-group members will
identify the troll, will not be baited by it, and may even mock those
who are.
Perhaps more commonly recognized definitions, outlined by Baker
(2001), Cox (2006), and Brandel (2007: 32), describe trolling as the post-
ing of incendiary comments with the intent of provoking others into
conflict. Naraine (2007: 146) also adds “ludicrous rants, inane thread-
jackings, personal insults, and abusive language” to the list. Meanwhile
Donath (1999) and Dahlberg (2001) add a further aspect to this and
suggest that trolling is a one-sided game of deception played on unwit-
ting others who assume that the troller is sincere when, in fact, she is
not: “The troll attempts to pass as a legitimate participant, sharing the
group’s common interests and concerns” (Donath 1999: 45). Then, “after
developing their false identity and becoming accepted within a group,
the troll sets about disrupting proceedings while trying to maintain his
or her cover” (Dahlberg 2001). The main point, however, is that none of
the research above takes its definitions from extended analysis of user-
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discussions of trolling. This work seeks to elaborate a more robust un-
derstanding of trolling, to argue for its validity as an object of research
within the field(s) of im/politeness, and to provide a working definition
in order to facilitate that research.
3. Data and methodology
The data for this paper is a corpus derived from a small subset of all
posts available from the public domain, unmoderated Usenet news-
group, rec.equestrian (RE). RE spans almost exactly nine years of in-
teraction (01/01/01-01/01/10)5 and is comprised of 186,470 posts.
WordSmith” (Scott 2009) was used to search the corpus for troll*6,
and whilst this returned 2,284 hits, of these, an estimated 1 % were false
(e. g., trolley, trollop). This left over 2,000 hits that included inflections
(troll, trolls, trolling, trolled), derivations (trolly, trollish, trolldom), ne-
ologisms (trollometer, trollbait, trollerita) and typographic errors (trol-
lign, trolll). However, no search is currently able to retrieve off-record
references to trolling (e. g., “it has a sub-bridge apartment”). Instances
such as this were only captured if troll* happened to occur elsewhere
in, for example, a more explicit reply by a user who had quoted a previ-
ous, off-record suggestion. Excluding false hits, all remaining examples
were analyzed and classified according to what seemed to be the user’s
main point(s) or issue(s). This resulted in surprisingly few categories.
Initially, only “deception”, “aggression”, and “disruption” clearly emerged
as highly recurrent themes. On further analysis, however, “success” also
emerged as a key feature. These characteristics, which are discussed in
turn below, are taken to form the basis of the working definition given
in this paper.
4. User discussions of trolling
Although in this analysis, four characteristics emerged, this is not to
suggest that this list is exhaustive, or representative of all CMC environ-
ments.
4.1. Deception
S-intent/H-interpretation is a problem for both H and analyst when at-
tempting to distinguish a “sincere” online identity from an “insincere”
trolling identity. As discussed in section 2.2 above, Donath (1999: 45)
and Dahlberg (2001), appearing to view the phenomenon from S’s per-
spective, describe how a troller will attempt to pass herself off as a legiti-
mate member and after developing her false identity, she will set about
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disrupting the group whilst trying to remain under cover. In line with
Donath (1999) and Dahlberg’s (2001) description of trollers keeping their
intent off-record, there are, unsurprisingly, very few examples of Ss going
on-record to acknowledge their secret intent to troll the group before-
hand (see example 10 above), though there are examples of users reveal-
ing an intent to troll after they have caused disruption or been “outed”
as a troll. Instead, most examples are of users struggling to distinguish
between “fictional” identities (whose professed intent is inconsistent with
the user’s real intent), and “real” identities (whose professed intent is felt
to be sincere):
Example (11) [090920]
13. A While it’s certainly possible this is a real email exchange, it
would be a good idea to try to track down B and verify that
this is a real person  not a troll.
Example (12) [060313]
14. C Here’s my opinion about the difference. Trolls are know-
ingly playing the group. They need some minimal savvy and
intelligence to do it. Idiots, which I equate with netkooks,
appear to seriously believe what they say.
Example (13) [071129]
15. D Well, if “she” follows suit like the troll “she” has been, there
will be a change of name and identity and perhaps even gen-
der, before the eventual reemergence.
Example (11) elaborates on the notion that the only way to be certain
that an identity is “real”, and not a deception, or in other words, a
troller, is to know the owner of that identity offline. Example (12) sug-
gests that this deception is wilfully and knowingly carried out, whilst
(13) outlines the full potential extent of the role-playing that might take
place. In this case, D describes a troller as someone who uses the ano-
nymity that CMC provides as a means by which to enact an identity
that is markedly inconsistent with that of his or her offline self, empha-
sizing the mutability of the identity (or indeed, identities) that someone
may create online.
The problem for users, of course, is that an individual who appears to
be a troller may simply be an inexperienced user who has misunderstood
an aspect of CMC, or who has acted upon expectations that others do
not share, or a young or emotionally vulnerable individual:
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Example (14) [071116]
16. A But in truth it is at times hard to distinguish a mentally
questionable, emotionally dysfunctional, lonely individual
from a troll … and many times the intent to troll might not
be there but the impact is the same (because the individual
cannot control his/her emotions.)
Example (15) [060317]
17. B If you think I’m a troll. I am not. I am a newbie. Learning
how to use Usenet. (not a discussion board as I have been
corrected)
Alternatively, the individual could be a troller who is playing upon these
possibilities, since dealing with a user who appears to be acting, or trying
to act, within the accepted norms for that activity type (Levinson 1979)
will be more problematic. Confronted trollers may deny the accusations,
plead ignorance or inexperience, brand those who block them as censori-
ous or cowardly, or even accuse individuals who confront them of being
trollers themselves (Herring 1999: 151; Herring et al. 2002: 377):
Example (16) [060516]
18. A Since everyone thinks I am a troll, I wont post here any-
more. I didn’t mean to come across the way I did, and this
group doesn’t mean anything to me anyway
Example (17) [070210]
19. B C is a troll.
20. C B is a very, very silly girl who is not quite sure what a troll
is, but she knows how to repeat sneers from other happy
group readers.
It is not always possible to confidently determine that someone is caus-
ing trouble intentionally and to label that person a troller. It is perhaps
easier (for H and analyst) to identify behaviours that are troll-like, and
then to asses that someone who continues these behaviours after being
warned otherwise is probably a troller. If H cannot be certain enough
that S intended to be maliciously impolite, then he may be forced to err
on the side of caution in his response. Should he actively retaliate, or
confront S on-record (line 22 below), then she too could utilize an appar-
ent mismatch between S-intent and H-interpretation by denying mali-
cious intent and framing her behaviour as non-malicious impoliteness,
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failed politeness, or mock impoliteness. If S is able to plausibly deny
impolite intent (line 23), H may find himself cast in the role of prime
aggressor, and being asked account for his behaviour:
Example (18) [031127]
21. A I never said I was having touble instilling simple stable
manners in my horse (or as you so rudely put it ... my
WP drudge) I am just PLAYING with this method out of
boredom. And having a great time at it.
22. B Ah, you’re trolling. That explains a lot.
23. A B, explain to me exactly how I am being a Troll. I am par-
ticipating in a ng [newsgroup] about horses. Thats all. We
are discussing a method of horse training that I like and
you don’t. I have stated from my original post that I was
just playing with this method because I was bored. So how
exactly does that make me a troll? Despite what everyone
has said, I have not been dishonest with any of my posts, I
have not been rude to any one, and I have not bashed their
chosen method of training. All of which has been done back
to me. If you think I am a troll I would like to know why.
This also problematizes the issue of the offensive-defensive strategies
proposed Harris et al. (1986), since, in example (18), what B seems to
view as defensive behaviour justifiably triggered by an off-record, or
impending attack, A seems to view as offensive, unjustifiable, and unpro-
voked behaviour. In this case, each interactant possibly perceives them-
selves as defensively countering the other’s offensive behaviour, and as
such, the way each utterance is categorized would depend on the view-
point adopted (Corsaro and Rizzo 1990).
A further type of troller described by Donath (1999: 45) and Utz
(2005: 50), and named the pseudo-naı¨ve troller by Donath (1999: 30),
intentionally disseminates poor or false advice under the guise of being
innocently unaware that the advice is wrong:
Example (19) [060922]
24. A Somehow you expect people to be diplomatic to you when
you have been trolling us. […] We only reply to your BS
[bullshit ] to keep others from thinking that you might be
giving them useful advice. Each and every time you jump in
with more of your dangerous advice you can rest assured that
someone is going to call you on it.
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Example (20) [061017]
25. B Most newbies will not have the ability to recognize a troll
post amid all the good advice posted, or the bad advice that
is suggested and then refuted. Leaving bad (troll) advise un-
refuted *will* mislead newbies who are diligently trying to
educate themselves.
Example (21) [070130]
26. C D is a troll and posts dangerous advice to newbies … trust
me, I would filter him in a second if I didn’t think his advice
is dangerous and could hurt someone.
These examples highlight the bind that users find themselves in when
they suspect that an ostensibly sincere user is giving out pseudo-naı¨ve
advice. A common method of dealing with trolling (discussed further
below) involves refusing to engage with the troller, but the moral obliga-
tion of keeping inexperienced users and their animals from harm can
outweigh the aggravation of “being trolled”, or in other words, of re-
sponding to, or “feeding”, a troller. This paper also suggests that pseudo-
naı¨ve trolling should include not only the act of giving advice, but also
of seeking advice in such a way as to provoke emotional responses:
Example (22) [060812]
27. A You’re not a criminal, but we get a LOT of trolls here who
pose impossibly naive scenarios in an attempt to start “flame
wars.”
Example (23) [060812]
28. B Since I can’t possibly imagine that anyone could really be
this naive or dumb in RL [real life], the best information I
could offer would be to go do your silly trolling in an-
other newsgroup.
Example (24) [031125]
29. C I’m a new horse owner …
30. D a troll posing as C wrote … I’m a new horse owner
31. E who has the sign ??
32. F Oh E, how COULD you? That just wasn’t very nice! We
should not make such assumptions that this poor, poor crea-
ture is not genuinely looking for help! And now we’ve missed
our opportunity to help! My oh my! [snork]
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These examples describe, or allude to a pseudo-naı¨ve question strategy
that involves posing as a new user who is an inexperienced horse-owner
with a highly naı¨ve question or “cry for help”, typically involving a
highly emotive topic. However, this strategy has been used in RE so
often that members even parody it:
Example (25) [051008]
33. A My horse is laying on the ground barely breathing. Until
I can get medical/surgical on him and can then call the vet
(not before next week), can you tell me: 1. what’s wrong
with him? and 2. do I even deserve a horse? Thanks in
advance! Love, trollerita
The heightened sensitivity that RE users are likely to feel with regards to
animal welfare and human safety presents would-be trollers with emotive
openings to exploit, especially given the difficulty of trying to distinguish
genuine “cries for help” from sophisticated trollers. This again places
users in the bind of not wishing to engage with (or “feed”) trollers, but
of feeling morally obliged to offer assistance where horse or human wel-
fare could be at stake:
Example (26) [050629]
34. A I’ve been watching this thread develop and, presuming you
are not a troll (and I’ll extend the benefit of the doubt) you
really don’t need to be thinking about this. You lack the
fundamental knowledge and experience necessary to be
caring for any more than your own animals.
Example (27) [060418]
35. B If you’re not a troll, x-ray’s aren’t that expensive so call a
vet with a brain in their head and get some taken.
As per both examples above, users occasionally highlight their inability
to confidently judge S’s intent by explicitly acknowledging their suspi-
cion that the other user could be trolling, whilst also trying to offer the
advice requested.
This leads on to the issue that since a troller is typically attempting to
pose (however briefly) as a legitimate user, it can take members several
posts to determine the troller’s intent, and the data provided many exam-
ples of users offering interpretations of S-intent, conveying their level of
confidence, and enquiring after other user’s interpretations:
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Example (28) [060828]
36. A And then there’s the (rapidly solidifying, at least for me)
notion that B is your garden-variety troll desperately seek-
ing something to fill an excess of spare time …
Example (29) [060531]
37. C D says I’m being unfair to you, but you are surely strarting
to smell like a troll.
Example (30) [060831]
38. E Y’know, F, I’ve been watching my troll-o-meter, and this
one has been scoring high. I haven’t *QUITE* decided that
it has a sub-bridge apartment, but boy, it sure looks suspi-
cious :)
In each example, users allude to their (growing) belief that S’s real intent
is to troll but that this intent is being concealed, and that it has taken
several posts for these users to arrive at their interpretation with suffi-
cient confidence. From this we can infer that a sophisticated troller may
succeed in never being recognized as such at all, or that her intent may
not be interpreted with enough confidence for users to feel justified in
taking action against her.
4.2. Aggression
A second dimension that emerged from the data was using “trolling”
to describe aggressive, malicious behaviour undertaken with the aim of
annoying or goading others into retaliating:
Example (31) [051015]
39. A Your comments, all too often, come with only invective and
insult and contain no content whatsoever. This latter is well
within the definition of trolling and baiting.
Example (32) [060812]
40. B Trolling means posting idiotic messages to rile up a news-
group or message board.
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Example (33) [060901]
41. C Look up the internet definition of Troll, and you’ll see that
people who flame and attack others online are the trolls.
Example (34) [070131]
42. D This poster is so argumentative, hostile and snotty and has
such disrespect for women or anyone with a different opin-
ion than he has, that reason can only conclude he is either
a miserable human being, or a troll.
In the above examples, users outline a range of what they feel are trolling
behaviours, which include more aggressive actions, such as insulting and
attacking others, and negatively marked characteristics such as being
“hostile”, “snotty”, and “idiotic”. The aggressive dimension to trolling
seems most consistent with both academic research and media coverage
on the topic, which tends to focus on the incendiary comments that
trollers post to provoke others into conflict (Baker 2001, Cox 2006;
Brandel 2007: 32), such as the “ludicrous rants, inane threadjackings,
personal insults, and abusive language” (Naraine 2007: 146).
4.3. Disruption
A third, less prevalent dimension found in the data was that of disrup-
tion; that is, causing aggravation without necessarily attacking a specific
individual. Within RE, prototypically disruptive behaviour included
meaningless, irrelevant, or repetitive posts aimed at attention-seeking or
response-generating:
Example (35) [071114]
43. A The end of your world is coming near. Most of you will die
in horrible pain, grilled alive by nuclear fire. The survivors
will have to resort to cannibalism in order to survive, but
sooner or later they’ll also die. Everyone will die.
44. B Good grief, are the teenybopper trolls home for the holi-
days already …
Example (36) [060106]
45. A No, like all trolls, your intent is to garner attention for your
pathetic self.
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Example (37) [060119]
46. C At this point, most of D’s responses are blatant trolling and
attention seeking behavior rather than an interest in the dis-
cussion.
In example (35), trolling appears to be seen as a behaviour that is a
general nuisance, though not necessarily personally aggressive or attack-
ing towards a specific user or user-group. For clarity, this has been
termed spam trolling, related to, but distinct from spam. Whilst both
spam and spam trolling are typically unsolicited, impersonal, and irrele-
vant, spam is usually driven by commercial gain and, one presumes, is
not intended to annoy recipients, whereas spam trolling is driven by the
intent to provoke aggravated responses. Within the data, the distinction
between disruption and aggression quite frequently blurred, since one
prime way of causing disruption and provoking responses it to post ag-
gressive comments, however examples (35)(37) are perhaps closest to
those cited in research by Herring et al. (2002: 372) and Turner et al.
(2005), who describe trolling as the luring of others into useless, circular
discussion which, though not necessarily aggressive in itself, may frus-
trate others with its unproductive nature (Tepper 1997: 41).
4.4. Success
One of the most interesting aspects of trolling that came to light was
how trollers are appraised by users for their degree of success both in
relation to the quality of the troll itself, and with regards to how others
respond to the troller:
Example (38) [090723]
47. A A troll who/which gets no response, has failed.
Example (39) [060830]
48. B You’re going to try to pull a loaded horse trailer with an
S10? I think you’re going to be minus an S10 in a hurry.
49. C He’s a troll. You bit.
As in example (39), certain, usually sincere, responses to trolls, such as
anger, shock, and curiosity, were considered “bites”, or in other words,
a demonstration by the respondent that he had unwittingly been de-
ceived by the troller’s professed pseudo-intent, and was unaware of her
real intent. In order to curtail a troller’s success, individuals frequently
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tried to explicitly manage the behaviours of other users (examples 40,
41), or implicitly manage the behaviour of the troller via threats (42, 43):
Example (40) [060515]
50. A FOLKS THIS IS A TROLL STOP FEEDING IT
Example (41) [060807]
51. B All I asked was “where have you been!?”. I wasn’t encour-
aging anything.
52. C Yes you were. Trolls should be ignored, not engaged in con-
versation.
Example (42) [031201]
53. D Haven’t we used up all the troll food yet?
54. E Yeah, but I’ve got some D-Con left. And a night scope on
my shotgun.
Example (43) [060622]
55. F Personally, I’m thinking the most appropriate treatment
would be a 150 grain copper/lead bolus administered intra-
cranially, but unfortunately, that’s considered an “off-la-
bel” use for trolls, and there’s so much paperwork involved
in getting approval that it isn’t worth the effort.
It was recurrently evident that not just any response was a success for
trollers. Interestingly, some users adopted response strategies which
aimed to fall outside of what the troller, and other users, might consider
as “biting” or “being trolled”:
Example (44) [051108]
56. A Fine or not, you went down in flames when you entered this
newsgroup. Even the dullards on this bunch eat trolls break-
fast and use their bones for toothpicks.
Example (45) [060515]
57. B Yes, of _course_ it’s a troll. So what? Troll-baiting can be fun.
58. C Precisely :) Especially when it reveals its weakness in its
first post.
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Example (46) [060318]
59. D Umm … E? Do you think F made up her hot_ail address
all special for us, just for this post? (Google is your friend.)
Do you think she really has a husband? Do you think she
is really even a _she_? Wait. I get it!!! You’re trolling the
troll. Had me going for a minute there. <g> [grin]
In the above examples, users endeavour to jeopardize the troller’s success
by demonstrating their awareness of what they feel is her real intent,
and by alluding to, or explicitly informing the troller not only of their
ability to deal with her effectively, but that rather than being sport for
the her amusement, as in examples (44) and (45), the users are capable
of turning the tables and making sport of trollers. Most interesting, how-
ever, is example (46), which indicates the ability of users to entirely
switch roles and take on a trolling identity in order to play a troller at
her own game.
From this it seems clear that trolling is a more complex issue than
simply launching unprovoked attacks on others; it is open to criticisms
on its quality, effectiveness and success. Users are quick to criticize
“bad”, obvious, and unsuccessful trolls:
Example (47) [060504]
60. A You might have to keep practising your trolling though. It’s
not very good.
Example (48) [060504]
61. B Worst troll I’ve seen in a LONG time. Must be a preteen.
Example (49) [050907]
62. C Why is anyone responding to this troll? In the history of
the trolls we have had here, he is not entertaining.
63. D Yes, but he’s a new troll. And he’s really dumb, no matter
what he says. Don’t tell me you’ve never watched a cat
tossing around a dead mouse and been amused …
Example (50) [060112]
64. E You know not who you are dealing with …
65. F Indeed I do- an exceptionally inept and entertaining troll.
In the above cases, the trollers were noted for their inability to troll well,
their lack of entertainment value, and, conversely, for the entertainment
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they provide for being inept. In particular, the users in example (49)
openly discuss the troller in the third person, at once employing the face-
saving strategy of not engaging with the troller directly, and also the
offensive face-attacking strategy of talking about the troller as though
she is non-existent.
Equally, “good”, sophisticated, successful trollers were appraised and
critiqued by users:
Example (51) [060531]
66. A Ah … now it makes sense. You *are* a troll! I suspected
as much. I give it to ya, you were a bit (only a bit) more
clever than most at the start but you couldn’t help yourself
could you …
Example (52) [060317]
67. B Ok, I get it. Nice subtle troll. Fair play to you, you had me
going there for a bit.
Example (53) [070114]
68. C It was a successful troll. I don’t know why people do it. It
must be a sort of perverted hobby, like graffiti or crapping
in dressing rooms.
Example (54) [070213]
69. D One thing I can say for E is that he’s the most successful
troll here, and everyone keeps contributing to his cause!
Duh. STOP already.
Example (55) [060317]
70. F I think we are dealing with an exceptionally talented troll!
She even has us talking about her in another thread. Without
feeding the troll, we are feeding the troll.
This suggests that even though trolling is meant as an aggravation to
users, it can become a two-sided game of point and counter-point where
a troller seeks to deceive and attack, and knowledgeable users parry
with critiques on the quality of the deception and the trolling, thereby
addressing the troller’s real intent, rather than her pseudo-intent.
5. A working academic definition of trolling
A primary issue with any im/politeness definition involves group norms
of legitimate behaviour. In the case of trolling, one person’s active debate
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is another person’s troll, and as Donath (1999: 47) suggests, a group’s
character will determine not only whether a troller is harmful to the
individual or the community, but whether a user is even deemed a troller
at all. To return to the earlier argument put forward in this paper, cur-
rently, there does not appear to be an elaborated academic term that
suitably captures trolling. Given that a troller actively intends to cause
trouble, harm, or aggravation, terms such as non-malicious impoliteness
and failed politeness by definition do not apply.
Interestingly, depending upon the context, group, and user(s) in ques-
tion, trolling can come close to mock impoliteness. Internet communities
whose users are inexperienced or vulnerable, or who invest personal
trust, emotional commitment, and private information, may find trolling
particularly hurtful, distressing, and inexplicable, and in such a context,
trolling could not qualify as mock impoliteness at all. However, commu-
nities whose users are less vulnerable, or more experienced or emotion-
ally detached, may in turn perceive trolling as closer to a ludic enactment
of conflict, akin to a competition (albeit at times a fierce one). Even in
this context, though, mock impoliteness does not fully account for troll-
ing, since mock impoliteness aims to enhance, or reinforce closeness and
affect, whereas being identified as a troller by users typically leads to the
troller being ostracized.
Malicious impoliteness too does not provide an adequate definition,
since trolling typically involves keeping one’s real intent to cause trouble
hidden behind a pseudo-intent to be sincere. As per Bousfield’s defini-
tion, “for impoliteness to be considered successful impoliteness, the in-
tention of the speaker (or ‘author’) to ‘offend’ (threaten/damage face)
must be understood by those in a receiver role” (2008: 72), whereas in
the case of trolling, to have a chance at success, the troller typically aims
to conceal her malicious, trolling intent, and to instead deceive H into
believing that she is a genuine group member whose intentions are sin-
cere.
In short, this paper suggests the following, working definition of the
term “troll”: A troller is a CMC user who constructs the identity of
sincerely wishing to be part of the group in question, including profess-
ing, or conveying pseudo-sincere intentions, but whose real intention(s)
is/are to cause disruption and/or to trigger or exacerbate conflict for the
purposes of their own amusement. Just like malicious impoliteness, troll-
ing can (1) be frustrated if users correctly interpret an intent to troll, but
are not provoked into responding (cf. example 35), (2) be thwarted, if
users correctly interpret an intent to troll, but counter in such a way as
to curtail or neutralize the success of the troller (cf. examples 4446),
(3) fail, if users do not correctly interpret an intent to troll and are not
provoked by the troller, or, (4) succeed, if users are deceived into believ-
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ing the troller’s pseudo-intention(s), and are provoked into responding
sincerely (cf. example 39). Finally, users can mock troll (cf. example 25).
That is, they may undertake what appears to be trolling with the aim of
enhancing or increasing affect, or group cohesion.
6. Conclusion
It seems clear that part of the human condition is to find a degree of
entertainment in conflict, whether in the form of high-risk sports, action
films, violent computer games, or linguistic aggression in television pro-
grams (Culpeper 1996, 2005; Culpeper et al. 2003; Bousfield 2008). How-
ever, unlike these situations where the individual typically only watches
or simulates conflict, online, with the protection of anonymity and dis-
tance, CMC users can exercise aggression against other real humans,
with little risk of being identified or held accountable for their actions.
Given the extraordinary prevalence of CMC in our daily lives, linguistic
and im/politeness research into negatively marked online behaviours
such as trolling is surprisingly scarce, but this paper hopes to highlight
the importance of this area, and to add in some small way to the body
of work that currently exists.
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Notes
1. I use im/politeness and field(s) to reflect the debate regarding whether impoliteness
and politeness should be seen as distinct entities. My view is that we cannot divorce
them, but should view each as more than a mere absence, corruption, or mirror of
its supposed opposite.
Trolling in asynchronous computer-mediated communication 239
2. For clarity, throughout, this work distinguishes between the ‘troller’ (the person),
‘troll’ (the message) and ‘trolling’ (the act).
3. All examples are as per the original with the following exceptions: (1) Bold empha-
sis is always mine. (2) For clarity and brevity, indenting punctuation (>) and line-
breaks have been removed. (3) Unclear/removed attributions have been clarified/
restored. (4) All personally identifying details are anonymized. (5) Glosses in italics
and square brackets are mine, e. g., lol [laugh out loud ].
4. Given the human mind’s inner workings, we might argue that even S may not fully
understand her own intentions.
5. My particular thanks go to Sebastian Hoffmann whose assistance was instrumental
in obtaining the 20012004 data.
6. The asterisk (*) wildcard denotes ‘zero or more characters’, so a search for cat*
will retrieve cat, cats, catch, cattle, etc.
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